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Pascal’s Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God, by Jeff Jordan. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 227. $65.00.
rAYmOND J. VANArrAgON, Bethel University
While many believers find traditional proofs for God’s existence to be ob-
scure and disconnected from their faith, the same does not seem true of 
pragmatic arguments for belief in God like those made famous by Blaise 
Pascal and William James. Cultivating belief in God in light of the poten-
tial benefits of doing so seems intuitively a sensible thing to do. In Pascal’s 
Wager, a new book by Jeff Jordan, these pragmatic arguments are explored 
and defended in some detail. Jordan himself concludes that pragmatic ar-
guments give good reason for a person to believe in God, provided that 
the person finds the evidence for and against God’s existence to be more 
or less counterbalanced.
The main focus of the book is the evaluation of the two versions of 
Pascal’s wager that Jordan considers most significant. The first, which he 
calls the Canonical version, is based on the expected utility of belief in 
God. As the argument goes, a person has two options, believing in God 
or not believing; and either God exists or God does not. Given a non-
zero probability that God exists and, if God does exist, an infinite reward 
for believers, one should believe in God, since the expected utility of that 
choice is infinite. This argument, then, is based on the potential post-mor-
tem benefits of believing.
The second argument Jordan calls the Jamesian version. It puts less 
emphasis on the potential eternal benefits of belief in God and focuses 
more on the goods that will accrue to the believer even if God does not 
exist. According to the Jamesian Wager, since one must choose between 
belief and non-belief (where options that fall under non-belief include 
atheism and belief in other deities), and (roughly speaking) the out-
comes that could come with belief in God are always as good or better 
than the outcomes of non-belief, and they are better even if naturalism 
obtains, one should believe in God. This Wager is called Jamesian, of 
course, because it is inspired by William James’ “Will to Believe” argu-
ment; but Pascal himself also thought that theists would lose nothing 
by believing:
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But what harm will come to you from taking this course? You will 
be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, doing good, a sincere and true 
friend. . . . I tell you that you will win thereby in this life. (Pascal, 
cited by Jordan, p. 24)
Thus Pascalian Wagers do not inevitably depend on potential post-mortem 
benefits.
After drawing out various versions of the Wager, Jordan spends much 
of the rest of the book on objections to it. His considered view is that the 
Jamesian Wager stands up to every objection even if the Canonical one 
does not.
The first objection claims that pragmatic reasoning—which involves 
coming to belief based on reasons that provide no evidence that the belief 
in question is true—is illegitimate. The most basic version of this objection 
claims, following W. K. Clifford, that it is always wrong to believe based on 
insufficient evidence. Jordan answers by giving a plausible case in which 
one ought to cultivate belief in an unsupported proposition because the 
lives of many people depend on one’s doing so. That aside, Jordan does en-
dorse what he calls “defeasible evidentialism,” which implies that the de-
mand for evidence is in force most of the time, even if there are exceptions 
to it. He also defends a number of principles that fill in his evidentialism 
and rule out holding beliefs in the absence of evidence, for pragmatic rea-
sons, in cases where the benefits of believing depend on the relevant prop-
osition’s being true. Of course, the Canonical Wager is truth-dependent, 
since if God does not exist there are no afterlife benefits to believing; hence, 
by Jordan’s lights, that Wager fails. With the Jamesian Wager, however, 
the benefits do not depend on the belief’s being true, and so the defeasible 
evidentialist’s demands are not violated.
Next Jordan tackles the famous many-gods objection. The objection 
comes in both possibilist and actualist varieties, where the former refers to 
what he calls “philosophers’ fictions” cooked up solely to refute Pascal’s 
Wager, and the latter refers to deities that are the objects of worship for 
actual religious groups. The standard possibilist version goes something 
like this. It is possible that God exists and that theistic belief will result in 
infinite happiness. At the same time, it is possible that there exists a deity 
who rewards with infinite happiness all and only those who do not be-
lieve in God. Moreover, these possibilities can be multiplied, so that there 
are infinitely many possible deities each of which rewards all and only 
those who believe in it. But then, in the first case, the expected utility of 
believing in God is precisely the same as that of not believing, and in the 
second, the Wager fails to recommend one deity over any of the others. 
Jordan’s basic response to this objection is to reject the assumption that 
all logical possibilities must be assigned some probability in pragmatic 
reasoning, and hence to claim that these philosophers’ fictions can safely 
be ignored and not treated as “practical possibilities,” even if the God of 
theism is taken seriously.
More troubling, perhaps, are the plausible deities posited by actual reli-
gions other than Christianity. How can a Pascalian decide between them? 
One might take Pascal’s own solution and be content that, for the person 
torn between different religious options, he or she should at least believe 
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one rather than remain agnostic or endorse naturalism. On the other hand, 
where each religious option has equal (infinite) expected utility, Jordan 
suggests that the bettor might sensibly seek to determine which option 
is most likely to be true. And the Jamesian Wager offers more resources 
for differentiation here, since where expected utility values of the options 
are equal (and infinite), the Jamesian can appeal to the truth-independent 
benefits that attend each option in this life, in order to break the tie.
In the next chapter Jordan considers the problems associated with infi-
nite utility values. The primary problem here has to do with standard deci-
sion theory, which does not countenance infinite values. This again causes 
trouble for the Canonical Wager because it is based on the infinite expected 
utility of belief in God, though nothing prevents the proponent of that ver-
sion from coming up with a more amenable decision theory or cashing out 
the argument in terms of very high but finite utility outcomes.
The final chapters of the book include a discussion of miscellaneous 
“showstopper” objections, all of which Jordan argues can be answered 
satisfactorily, and a collection of alternative pragmatic arguments for be-
lief (or hope) in God courtesy of William James, John Stuart Mill, James 
Beattie, and others. In his conclusion, Jordan turns briefly to concerns 
about divine hiddenness, and in particular to the claim that the lack of 
weighty evidence for God’s existence is good evidence that God does not 
exist. Jordan argues that this claim is mistaken, and hence that people who 
find the evidence for God inconclusive can legitimately take the next step 
and use pragmatic reasons to guide their belief.
In all, this is a very good book for explanation and discussion of differ-
ent aspects of Pascal’s Wager and the literature surrounding it. The book 
does seem a little dry at times, and Jordan might have used more helpful 
titles for the complex epistemic principles he comes up with. (He simply 
uses letters as labels, which makes it difficult later on to remember what 
principles he is referring to.)
The least satisfying part of the book, in my view, is Jordan’s discussion 
of evidentialism. As I said, Jordan endorses a softer version of eviden-
tialism, one which allows that the demand for evidence be lifted under 
certain conditions. But it is not wholly clear what Jordan’s evidentialism 
amounts to, especially with regard to belief in God, and it is also doubt-
ful that many people are in the epistemic position that Jordan requires 
them to be in before they may allow pragmatic considerations to guide 
their believing.
Part of the problem is Jordan’s lack of precision when discussing prob-
abilities, together with his apparent inclination to equate “believing that 
p” with “believing that p is probable.” One can see some of this in the fol-
lowing statement about the evidentialist demand.
With regard to any proposition that one entertains, a person will 
stand in one of four doxastic states. Either one will have the belief 
that the proposition’s probability value is greater than one-half, or 
one will believe that the proposition’s probability is less than one-
half, or one will believe that its probability value is one-half, or one 
will have no determinate belief concerning the probability value 
of the proposition. According to the evidentialist imperative, one 
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should believe a proposition only if one finds oneself in the first dox-
astic state. (p. 47)
Now this gives only a necessary rather than sufficient condition for per-
missible belief, but nonetheless it is difficult to know how the condition 
applies. Most of us, I expect, give no thought to the probability values of 
most of the propositions we entertain, in which case we surely do not have 
determinate beliefs about the probability values of those propositions. 
But then the above quotation implies that we are not justified in believ-
ing them—an unusual path to the conclusion that most of our beliefs are 
not justified. So Jordan’s characterization of evidentialism is problematic 
if explicit consideration of the probabilities is required. But suppose it is 
required only that we be inclined to believe that propositions we believe 
are probably true. If so, then we get the opposite problem: the requirement 
becomes too easy to fulfill. After all, to believe a proposition is to believe 
that it is true and not merely probably true, and hence to be inclined to as-
sign it a probability of one. And so the evidentialist imperative is met for 
every proposition we believe.
This cannot be what Jordan’s evidentialist has in mind. Perhaps in the 
passage cited earlier, Jordan is thinking of epistemic probability (a notion 
he does not discuss until later), where the requirement is that for any 
proposition one believes, one also believes that its probability is greater 
than one-half on the evidence that one has. Even with this qualification, 
however, I suspect that most of us do not typically have a lot of beliefs like 
these, which again would render many of our beliefs unjustified. And if 
we say again that what is required is only that one is inclined to believe 
the probability is greater than one-half on one’s evidence, we are left with 
extremely vexed questions about what evidence one can appeal to in these 
situations and about how evidence of certain sorts renders probable the 
relevant propositions.
It seems to me that difficulties of this sort with Jordan’s account of evi-
dentialism leak into his discussion of belief in God, and call into question 
how many people are actually in the initial position where Jordan’s Pas-
calian reasoning would be available to them. Jordan’s conclusion, recall, is 
that the Jamesian Wager gives to a person who judges that God’s existence 
has a probability of one-half or slightly below (on the evidence) good 
pragmatic grounds for believing in God anyway, and that cultivating that 
belief on those grounds is legitimate and does not violate the evidentialist 
demand. But I doubt that many people engage in the sort of evidence-
weighing and probability-assigning that Jordan requires as a prelude 
to pragmatic considerations. Jordan does say that a professional-caliber 
weighing of the arguments for and against God’s existence is not required 
for most people. Indeed, at one point he says that the general evidential-
ist requirement can be met with experiential rather than propositional evi-
dence (p. 44). If certain kinds of experiences can constitute evidence for 
(or against) God’s existence, that may make it easier for regular people to 
meet Jordan’s evidentialist demand. Unfortunately, Jordan never applies 
this concession to belief in God, and he never considers what experiential 
evidence for God might be. Instead, he says that the Pascalian needs natu-
ral theology to offset the evidence provided by natural atheology (p. 110). 
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But this only makes it more unlikely that regular people are going to be 
in the epistemic position that for Jordan must constitute the Pascalian’s 
starting point.
In short, Jordan’s defeasible evidentialism, though more lenient than 
some of the alternatives, contains elements that strike me as unrealistic, 
and this infects his discussion of the epistemic requirements placed on the 
prospective bettor. Jordan says, and I agree, that pragmatic considerations 
are instrumental in the lives of many believers. My complaint is that his 
version of the Wager does not seem to “bridge the gap between the acad-
emy and the ‘real world’” in the way that he suggests in his preface. Many 
people tempted by Pascalian arguments, I suspect, do not engage in the 
sort of evidence weighing and probability assigning that Jordan appears 
to require. Instead, they find themselves inclined toward belief and seek, 
for pragmatic reasons, to cultivate it, to make it deeper, to turn it into the 
sort of conviction that can shape their lives and their characters. Much of 
what Jordan says in defense of the Wager (and in opposition to too-strong 
evidentialism and the many-gods objection) could be useful to the believer 
who desires to turn her mustard-seed faith into something stronger. And 
that is significant even if Jordan’s way of characterizing the initial position 
of the prospective bettor is not entirely true to life. 
intellectual virtues: an essay in regulative epistemology, by Robert C. Roberts 
and W. Jay Wood. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. x + 329.
ANTHONY RUDD, St Olaf College
Perhaps the most interesting and fruitful development in recent episte-
mology has been the renewal of interest in the intellectual virtues. Rob-
erts and Wood’s book is a major contribution to this emerging tradition. 
It is divided into two parts. In the first, the authors discuss the nature 
of the intellectual virtues in general terms, looking at their importance 
for epistemology, their relation to the goods of intellectual inquiry, to the 
practices within which those goods are pursued and to faculties (such as 
memory, vision and so on). Part Two gives detailed discussions of particu-
lar virtues—starting with the Love of Knowledge, and going on to Firm-
ness, Courage and Caution, Humility, Autonomy, Generosity and Practi-
cal Wisdom. As the authors say, discussions of virtue epistemology have 
tended to concentrate on the more general issues they address in Part One, 
so the detailed analyses in Part Two are an important reason why this 
book is distinctive.
The first chapter surveys the recent history of thought about the intel-
lectual virtues. Roberts and Wood follow Zagzebski in favouring a rich, 
broadly Aristotelian account of the intellectual virtues as character traits, 
rather than Sosa’s equation of virtues with properly functioning faculties 
(p. 7). However, they reject Zagzebski’s attempt to use a virtue-based ap-
proach to solve the Gettier problem and produce a definition of knowledge 
(pp. 9–14). There are many things we can know simply through the proper 
